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Abstract
In this paper,we construct an equilibrium search model of the labor
market augmented to include lump sum taxes that nance government
expenditures. Using the model, we can decompose the decline in labor
force participation (LFP) into the policy e¤ect and that of other factors
such as declining economic output. Using census data for the state of
Ohio, we learn that declining LFP and the increase in public assistance
spending were caused by weaker economic output that led to an increase in
the claimant count. Our results indicate that if the economy resembled the
pre-crisis period, the Kasich administration would have led to an increase
in LFP of approximately 0.6 percentage points. This e¤ect goes up to 2%
if all inactive workers are assumed to claim welfare income.
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1 Introduction
Governor John Kasich spent nearly two decades in Congress before winning
election as Ohio Governor for the rst time in 2010. He won re-election by
an overwhelming 30 points in 2014. By September 2015, the unemployment
rate in Ohio was down to 4.5%, according to data compiled by the Federal
Reserve, a signicant improvement from near 9.0% when John Kasich took
o¢ ce in 2011 and Ohios joblessness and the national rate were tied. How
much of this improvement can be credited to the Governor John Kasich and his
administration?
Since 2005 (before the Great-recession), labor force participation has been on
a decline both in Ohio and in the rest of the nation. During the same period,
in the state of Ohio, the share of General Revenue Fund (GRF) disbursements
that went to Public Assistance and Medicaid has increased. The GRF only
represents just under half of the money the state spends. It represents those
funds which are most exible, in most cases not designated for a specic purpose,
and so the state has more discretion over the allocation of these funds. On
one hand, Governor Kasich cut taxes. On the other hand, despite an overall
decrease in spending, transfers to households in the form of public assistance
which already dominated GRF expenditures, have been on the rise. The 2014
gure represents a 13.82% increase compared to 2007 under the last conservative
governor. GRF disbursement tables for 2007, 2011, 2012 and 2014 are included
in the appendix.
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In this article, we compare labor market outcomes before and after governor
John Kasich. Using an equilibrium search model of the labor market, we
estimate the value of labor force participation (LFP) for Ohio before (under
governor Taft) and after governor Kasich. In addition, we investigate whether
the spending increase on public assistance to households was caused by changes
in the government attitude toward nancing welfare payments (policy e¤ect)
or by other factors such as a weaker economy. Using the model, we can
decompose labor force participation into the policy e¤ect and that of other
factors such as a declining economic output. In other words: did the value
of employment income decrease relative to welfare income due to the economic
climate or because of government policy? We then provide a discussion about
the labor market e¤ects of welfare spending in the long run.
Existing studies regarding the e¤ect of scal policy on labor market outcomes
are worth mentioning. Ravn and Simonelli (2007) nd that expansionary scal
policy stimulates employment and lowers unemployment. Bruckner and Pappa
(2011) provide evidence that unemployment rates can also increase as a result of
a scal expansion due to increased labor force participation. To reconcile theory
with evidence, they add the participation margin in a New Keynesian model with
labor market frictions as in Ravn (2008). In their framework, due to sticky
prices, the increase in government spending generates a labor demand e¤ect and
so more workers enter the market since in times of high labor demand, their
probability of nding a job increases. Their result relies on the following key
assumptions: (1) price stickiness in the short run causes real wages to increase
3
when government expenditures causes an increase in aggregate demand which
in turn causes labor demand to increase (2) All workers who are not employed
(insiders and outsiders) whether participating or not, collect unemployment
benets in their framework which is also key to generating increases in labor
force participation.
A long list of literature has highlighted the postive e¤ects of welfare reform
on labor force participation. Lubotsky (2004) provides empirical evidence that
the 1991 elimination of the General Assistance program in Michigan contributed
to a 2-4% increase in LFP among high school dropouts (low skilled workers).
For a complete review of this literature, see Bartik (2000).
The main challenge in measuring the e¤ect of a scal expansion is caused
by the fact that although government expenditures a¤ect economic variables
which in turn also a¤ect scal policy and the size of government transfers to
households. A scal expansion is often the endogenous outcome of a decrease
in economic activity that leads to an increase in the claimant count. With
these issues in mind, we construct a dynamic equilibrium search model of the
labor market augmented to include the labor force participation decision and
government budgeting. We impose a balanced government budget such that
any increase in government spending must be fully funded by lump sum taxes
on labor income. In our model, we distinguish between job seekers allowance
(unemployment benets) which incentivizes labor force participation and welfare
transfers to inactive households that reward the welfare scrounge.
In our model, an increase in the value of welfare provision leads to a decline
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in labor force participation (LFP) since less unemployment compensation im-
plies lower job search subsidies. On the positive side, when the labor market
becomes less congested, the job nding rate increases and the unemployment
rate falls. The problem arises from the fact that since LFP declined, even
though workers nd jobs at a faster rate, fewer workers are actually in employ-
ment. This decrease in the stock of employed workers causes tax revenues to
decrease and so the unemployment benet falls, reducing the job search incen-
tive further. This negative e¤ect on job search incentives is exacerbated by
poor economic conditions i.e. a decline in output. It is in fact well documented
that higher unemployment insurance subsidizes job search thus causing both
higher participation incentives despite longer spells of unemployment (see the
search theoretic literature on unemployment insurance). On the rm side, jobs
are created so long as the surplus is non-negative. This implies that decrease
in the surplus leads to a decrease in the number of new vacancies.
State welfare transfers discourage labor force participation of less able work-
ers. High ability individuals enter the labor market, and are also more likely to
nd a job. The outcome of this policy is an economy plagued with higher in-
equality since the concentration of welfare gains go to a fewer number of highly
able employed individuals, while the larger inactive population is left equally
sharing the collected tax revenue. A recession exacerbates the negative e¤ects
of welfare spending since total government revenues fall during a recession for
two reasons: (1) the government is not allowed to borrow in our framework
and (2) an increase in taxes causes the surplus to decrease. As a result, fewer
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vacancies are created, the job nding rate decreases leading to a higher jobless
rate at lower levels of welfare income.
Our results indicate that if economic conditions resembled the pre-crisis pe-
riod, the change in administration would have led to an increase in labor force
participation of approximately 0.6 percentage points. On the other hand, the
unemployment rate would have also increased by 0.04 percent. When we assume
that all inactive workers collect welfare payments, the policy change leads to a
2% increase in LFP. Our quantitative analysis reveals that Governor John Ka-
sich policies caused the value of welfare income to decrease and so the observed
increase in public assistance spending is due mostly to economic conditions out-
side of the administrations control, that led to an increase in the claimant
count. It is not all bad news for Ohio since the governors good judgment led
cuts in distortionary income taxes. It is the rst move in the right direction.
Productivity growth is low and so rising living standards will depend on getting
the economy back on track in terms of higher rates of new business startups.
Steps in the right direction would include less intervention, less regulation and
lastly even fewer transfers to inactive households in order to promote the right
incentives.
In the next section, we present stylized facts about the Ohio economy and
the rest of the US states which will be used for our quantitative analysis. In
section 3, we introduce our model. In section 4, we present our quantitative
analysis and a discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Stylized Facts
For our analysis, we use IPUMS USA complete samples for 2007 and 2014. We
restrict our analysis to men (heads of household) in the working age population
(age 25-54). We do so to avoid picking up the e¤ect of gender di¤erences,
fertility and marriage market implications for labor force participation.
Unemployment rates followed the rest of the nation during the recession,
however since 2010, the unemployment rate has declined faster in Ohio than in
the rest of the nation, returning to pre-crisis levels. Labor force participation
has been on a steady decline both in Ohio and the rest of the nation even when
compared to pre-crisis levels. The following gures illustrate the unemployment
rate.
Fig. 1: Unemployment: working age 25-54
7
Fig. 2: LFP rates: working age population (age 25-54)
In table 1 and 2, we compare cross-sections before and after the crisis. Labor
force participation was 2.2 % higher in 2007 compared to 2014. Although
nominal wages remained constant, real wages were lower in 2014.
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Table 1: Ohio Labor Market 2007 2014
LFP rate 0.882 0.860
Unemployment rate 0.058 0.061
Real mean hourly wage 20.89 17.21
Job Separation rate 0.017 0.015
Un. reporting welfare income 0.035 0.048
Inactive reporting welfare income 0.0460 0.056
Un. Benet / Market wages 0.0424 0.0550
Welfare / Market wages 0.0440 0.0392
Table 2: The rest of US States 2007 2014
LFP rate 0.876 0.854
Unemployment rate 0.046 0.058
Un. reporting welfare income 0.032 0.051
Inactive reporting welfare income 0.030 0.037
3 The Model
Time is discrete. The economy is populated with homogeneous agents of mass
Ns workers. All agents live T  2 periods and discount the future at rate
 = e(1   
), where 
 is the rate at which agents exit the economy and
retire. They can stay out of the market, they can enter the market and
become employed or end up unemployed. The superscript s 2 fn; e; ugdenotes
the state of workers for not participating, employed or unemployed respectively.
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The surplus is dened as x   R   k, where x is the output produced by a
successful match, R is the workers reservation value and k is the value of
the rms outside option i.e. the cost of posting a vacancy (assuming free
entry). Employed workers earn a wage w = (x   R   k). Workers are taxed
a lump sum tax w. Each period the government collects tax revenues spent
on unemployment benets and other forms of household transfers. There is
no government borrowing and so the tax rate balances the government budget
constraint each period.
Agents in our economy solve the following problem:
maxE0
TX
t=0
tU(Ct) (1)
where Ct is the periods consumption.
3.1 The Labor Market
At the matching stage, vacancies and workers who are searching are matched
through the following matching process. A vacancy searching meets an appli-
cant with probability q()where q : R+ ! [0; 1] is a twice-di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave function with boundary conditions q(0) = 0 and
q(1) = 1. Similarly, a worker in a given submarket meets a vacancy with
probability () = q()=, (0) = 0 and (1) = 1. We refer to  as the queue
of applicants, that is the ratio of workers to available vacancies (the inverse of
the labor market tightness). Unemployed workers consume b. We dene the
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"queue" as:
  
u
v

(2)
where u denotes unemployed workers, v is the mass of vacancies and  is a
matching e¢ ciency parameter.
The probability that a vacancy receives at least one applicant is:
q() = 1  exp( ) (3)
We now dene the probability that a worker nds a job as:
() =
q()

(4)
3.2 Value Functions
3.2.1 Workers
The value of an unemployed worker is:
V u = R+ ()V e(w) (5)
where
R = A+ b+ V u (6)
In other words, if an unemployed worker is not lucky in the labor market,
he obtains the unemployment benet and gets to search again in the following
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period.
The value of an employed worker is:
V e(w) = w   w + [(1  )V e(w) + R] (7)
The value of a worker who does not participate in the labor market is:
V n = A+ T + V u (8)
where T is the government transfer. This transfer can be interpreted as pub-
lic assistance, disability benets i.e. the share of government spending that is
enjoyed by the inactive share of the working age population. The probability
that an agent enters the labor market is   Pr[  ] where the thresh-
old   V n   V u.  is assumed to be i.i.d and symmetric about its mean
and can represent unobserved idiosyncratic ability or perhaps other unobserved
characteristics that make some individuals more prone to market participation.
The workers problem at the start of each period is:
V = maxfV u; V ng (9)
3.2.2 Firms
The value of a vacant job is:
JV = k + q()JF (10)
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The value of a lled job us:
JF = x  w + [(1  )JF + R] (11)
We assume free entry and so vacancies are created until the surplus is exhausted
such that:
k = q()JF (12)
3.3 The Government Sector
Given the government preference for providing public assistance to households,
the government must choose the taxes and the unemployment benet that bal-
ances its budget.
Tax revenues each period are paid by the employed population:
T = wN
e (13)
where Ne =  () N
G = Nub+NnTn (14)
where Nu = U [1   ()] N , Nn = I(1  )N . U and I represent the
fraction of unemployed and inactive working age individuals who claim welfare
income.
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zT = NnTn and so
b =
T   (NnTn)
Nu
=
T (1  z)
Nu
(15)
Since the government budget constraint is binding, the tax
w =
T
Ne
=
G
Ne
(16)
The government budget constraint is binding and so the tax w is chosen
such that T = G.
3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a queue fg, tax schedule fwg and unemployment
benet fbg that satisfy the worker and rm value functions such that government
budget constraint holds with equality.
3.5 Algorithm
For any given level Tn and z
 Set an initial guess for the tax fwg and unemployment benet fbg
 Guess on the population that enters the labor market
 Compute the queue and the implied job nding rates from the matching
technology described in the earlier section of the paper
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 Using the job nding rate, update the value of workers, rms and compute
tax revenues as well as government expenditures.
 Check that the government constraint holds otherwise update the tax and
the value of the unemployment benet
 Using the model outcomes, update the initial population guesses and it-
erate until convergence. A steady state equilibrium is reached when the
job nding rates are constant after each iteration, i.e. the model out-
come has converged to the inital guess and so the fraction of workers who
participate in the market each period is constant. In addition, the tax
and unemployment benet are such that the government runs a balanced
budget.
4 Quantitative Analysis
For our analysis, we divide parameters into xed parameters which are observed
and directly taken from the data and free parameters which are estimated to
match moments from the same data. Our xed parameters include e which is
chosen to match the US yearly interest rate. The retirement rate 
 = 0:04,
implying that 4% of workers exit the market each period. We use the US
yearly average job separation rates. We obtain U the fraction of unemployed
claiming welfare income from the US census for each year respectively. We can
also retrieve I the fraction of inactive workers who report welfare income from
the data.
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There are four free parameters chosen jointly to match the following moments
from the data: the labor force participation rate, the unemployment rate, the
real wage, the ratio of welfare income to market income. Tables containing
the value of xed parameters and estimated parameters are included in the
appendix.
Results from our analysis suggest that the value of welfare income increased
while the value of market participation decreased. The following table shows
the gains from labor force participation in Ohio in 2007 and in 2014.
Table 3: Model Results 2007 2014 % change
Gain from LFP (V u   V n) 29.0612 24.9017 -14.31%
V u 33.3887 29.5626 -11.46%
V n 4.3274 4.6608 7.70%
Table 4 highlights results from a counterfactual: What would the labor
market look like under Governor Kasich if economic conditions resembled the
pre-crisis period? Holding output per worker, the value of transfers and match-
ing e¢ ciency parameters xed at their 2007 levels, we investigate the e¤ect of
the change in z to the 2014 levels: a change to the parameter that estimates
government policy.
Table 4: Counterfactual Data: 2014 Data: 2007
LFP rate 0.888 0.860 0.882
Unemployment rate 0.0584 0.0610 0.0580
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Table 5: Model Results 2007 (z = 0:9988) Counterfactual (z = 0:1749)
Gain from LFP (V u   V n) 29.0612 29.8079
V u 33.3887 33.9584
V n 4.3274 4.1505
Table 6: Model Results Kasich E¤ect
Gain from LFP (V u   V n) 2.57 %
V u 1.71%
V n -4.09%
Our results indicate that if economic conditions resembled the pre-crisis pe-
riod, the change in the policy regarding welfare transfers would have led to
an increase in labor force participation of approximately 0.6 percentage points.
On the other hand, the unemployment rate would have also increased by 0.04
percent. When we assume that all inactive workers collect welfare payments,
the policy e¤ect goes from a 0.6% to a 2% increase in LFP. Governor Kasich
administration contributed to a 2.57% increase in the gains from labor force
participation.
4.1 Discussion: Welfare Spending in the Long Run
In this section we compare steady state outcomes to investigate the e¤ects of
an increase in the value of government transfers to inactive households. As the
share of tax revenues that goes to inactive households increases at the expense
of benets to job seekers, fewer workers self-select to enter the labor market.
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Those who enter are also more likely to nd a job since the labor market becomes
less congested (see g. 3). The result is higher inequality since the net losers
are job seekers. This negative e¤ect of welfare transfers is accentuated in a
weak economic climate.
In gure 4, we show the e¤ects of a decrease in output conditional on the
government attitude toward welfare tranfers. The negative e¤ects of declining
output are accentuated in a welfare state. Aggregate welfare declines at a
faster rate. Fewer employed workers pay higher taxes to provide transfers to
the larger inactive population.
Fig. 3: E¤ect of Welfare Transfers
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Fig. 4: Declining Output
5 Conclusion
In this article, we construct a dynamic equilibrium search model of the labor
market augmented to include a government sector. We learn that an increase
in the share of government revenues that is spent on welfare programs can cause
labor force participation to decrease. Welfare transfers discourage labor force
participation of less able workers. A smaller number of high ability individuals
enter the labor market, and are also more likely to nd employment. The
outcome is higher inequality since the larger inactive population is left equally
sharing the collected tax revenue. Our results are particularly interesting since
policymakers who are concerned with reducing inequality often advocate for
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increases in welfare spending.
Using Census data for the state of Ohio, we learn that if economic conditions
in 2014 resembled the pre-crisis period, Governor Kasichpolicy toward welfare
transfers would have led to an increase in labor force participation by approxi-
mately 0.6 percentage points. On the other hand, the unemployment rate would
have also increased by 0.04 percent. We dene the gains from labor force par-
ticipation as the value of market participation net the value of welfare income.
Our results suggest that Governor Kasichadministration can be credited for a
2.57% increase in the gains from labor force participation. The simplicity of
our reduced form model provides a great tool for educators and policymakers.
The model can easily be extended to answer a substantial number of related
policy questions.
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APPENDIX
Model Parameters
Table 7: Fixed Parameters
Discount factor e = 0:96
Retirement rate 
 = 0:04
Job separation rate 2007 = 0:017; 2014 = 0:015
Ohio Transfer recipients in 2007* OhioU;2007 = 0:035; 
Ohio
I;2007 = 0:046
Ohio Transfer recipients in 2014 OhioU;2014 = 0:048; 
Ohio
I;2014 = 0:056
*Fraction of inactive population receiving welfare income
Table 8: Ohio2007 Estimated Parameters Data Target
Output per worker x = 29:7954 Wage income
Government budget parameter z = 0:9988 LFP rate
Matching function parameter  = 0:1369 Unemployment rate
Value of Transfer to Inactive HHs Tn = 0:7829 Ratio of welfare income to market income
Table 9: Ohio2014 Estimated Parameters Data Target
Output per worker x = 26:1982 Wage income
Government budget parameter z = 0:1749 LFP rate
Matching function parameter  = 0:1479 Unemployment rate
Value of Transfer to Inactive HHs Tn = 0:6146 Ratio of welfare income to market income
Wages, Unemployment benets and Welfare Income
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Table 10a: IPUMS USA 2007 2014
Welfare income claim 2194.038 2025.652
Unemployment claim 2114.286 2833.636
Yearly market income 49870.13 51737.51
Weekly Hours worked 44.23 43.29
Table 10b: IPUMS USA 2007 2014
Welfare (relative to market income) 0.044 0.039
Unemployment benet (relative to market income) 0.042 0.055
Welfare income to inactive households has decreased while the unemployed
benet increased relative to market income. These facts are consistent with a
decrease in the value of staying out of the market.
The General Revenue Fund
In tables 11a, 11b and 11c, we compare changes in the General Revenue Fund
(GRF) Expenditures in real terms between 2007 and 2014. Ohio State General
Revenue fund disbursements can be obtained from the Ohio O¢ ce of Budget
and Management (http://obm.ohio.gov/Budget/monthlynancial/default.aspx).
The share of disbursements that go to Public Assistance and Medicaid has
increased.
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Table 11a : Disbursements (in thousands) 2007/CPI=582.343 (1967=100)
Education 4,788,797 (8223.33)
Public Assistance and Medicaid 5,290,167 (9084.28)
Health and Human Services 658,754 (1131.21)
Community and Economic Development 85,227 (146.35)
Tax relief/Property tax reimbursement 617,254 (1059.95)
Other Expenditures 1,579,460 (2712.25)
Total 13,019,659 (22357.37)
Table 11b : Disbursements (in thousands) 2014/CPI=706.977
Education 4,645,563 (6571.02)
Public Assistance and Medicaid 7,310,019 (10339.83)
Health and Human Services 653,057 (923.73)
Community and Economic Development -
Tax relief/Property tax reimbursement 893,067 (1263.22)
Other Expenditures 1,880,872 (2660.44)
Total 15,382,578 (21758.23)
In 2007, Public assistance and Medicaid made up 40.6% of all GRF disburse-
ments, up to 47.5 % of GRF disbursements in 2014. Total GRF disbursements
decreased by 2.68%, however spending on public assistance and medicaid in-
creased by 13.82%.
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Table 11c : Disbursements (in thousands) 2011 2012
Education 4,704,566 4,621,675
Public Assistance and Medicaid 5,860,256 6,765,225
Health and Human Services 592,201 555, 938
Community and Economic Development 55,835 47,411
Tax relief/Property tax reimbursement 841,655 865,060
Other Expenditures 1,602,883 1,350,212
Total 13,657,396 14,205,521
Table 11c reveals that Public assistance made up 42% of the GRF actual
disbursements in 2011 and 47.6% of expenditures in 2012.
Table 11d: Receipts (in thousands) 2007 2014
Tax Receipts 8,695,846 (14392.5) 9,968,148 (14099.7)
Non-Tax Receipts 2,971,687 (5102.98) 4,618,300 (6532.46)
Transfers 255,986 (439.58) 52,730 (74.59)
Table 11d reveals that tax receipts decreased by 2.03% in real terms while it
is non-tax receipts that in fact have contributed to the increase in the General
Revenue Fund receipts. Most of this increase in non-tax receipts was pro-
vided by the Federal government in the form of grants and reimbursement to
the state for certain GRF expenditures made by the Department of Job and
Family Services. In 2007 non-tax receipts made up 25.6% of all receipts while
in 2014, these federal grants made up 31.6% of all receipts. Taking ination
into account, we learn from the tables that GRF Expenditures are 2.68% below
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expenditures during the pre-recession Taft administration. Despite an over-
all decrease, public assistance and medicaid are 13.82% higher in 2014 under
Governor Kasich than under Governor Taft in 2007.
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